Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge by Davison, Scott A.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 21 Issue 3 Article 6 
7-1-2004 
Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge 
Scott A. Davison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Davison, Scott A. (2004) "Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 21 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
CRAIG ON THE GROUNDING OBJECTION TO 
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 
Scott A. Davison 
Recently William L. Craig has argued that the so-called "Grounding 
Objection" against Molinist theories of providence can be answered. I show 
that despite Craig's clever arguments to the contrary, the Grounding Objection 
has not been answered, so it still represents a serious obstacle to the accep-
tance of Molinism. 
According to Luis de Molina's theory of providence ("Molinism"'), logical-
ly prior to the creation of the world, God knew what people would freely 
choose to do if placed in certain situations, and this knowledge guided 
God's choices about what to create. (If we follow St. Augustine in thinking 
that God created time itself, then we cannot talk about what happened 
before creation in a temporal sense of before'; but we can still talk about 
the logical sense of 'before', which refers to the order of explanation, 
instead of the order of time.) In other words, Molina's theory implies that 
God knew many propositions of the following form: "If creature S were 
placed in circumstances C, then S would freely perform action A." 
Following a somewhat misleading tradition, let's call this type of proposi-
tion a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. 
Molinists believe that the word 'freely' as it appears in counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom must be understood in some Libertarian sense, so 
that a person's action is free only if it is not determined by prior events, the 
laws of nature, or the activity of other agents. Now the Grounding 
Objection claims that Molinism must be wrong because logically prior to 
creation, there were no truths about what people would freely choose to do 
if placed in certain situations. William L. Craig has argued recentlt that 
the Grounding Objection is quite mistaken. By contrast, I think that the 
Grounding Objection (or something in the neighborhood, perhaps some-
thing that the Grounding Objector could have said or should have said) is 
much stronger than Craig thinks it is. 
Professor Craig claims that liThe Molinist is under no obligation to pro-
vide warrant for [the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom], since he is merely proposing a model which is intend-
ed as one possible solution to the alleged antinomy of divine sovereignty 
and human freedom" (Craig, p.339). But this seems wrong to me: true 
Molinists claim not just that God's providence might involve knowledge of 
true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, but rather that it actually does. 
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(True Molinists include Molina, of course, and Craig himself, as far as I can 
tell from his other writings.) There may also be "Modal Molinists" out 
there (that is, persons who regard Molinism as just one possible picture of 
the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom), but the 
true Molinists are the ones making a positive assertion here, so they have 
the initial burden of proof concerning the assumption that there are true 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. 
To his credit, Craig does say three things (pp.338-9) in defense of this 
assumption (even though he does not feel obligated, as a Molinist, to do 
so). But they are not very convincing. First, I disagree with Craig's claim 
that "we ourselves often appear to know such true counterfactuals" (338), 
and his claim that they play an indispensable role in our rational conduct 
and planning (338). Instead, to repeat a well-worn point in this debate, 
what we really know is what people will probably do, not what they will 
freely do, and this is what plays an indispensable role in our rational con-
duct and planning. In fact, we are probably never in a position to say with 
much confidence that any particular action is free (in the Libertarian sense 
employed by Craig and the Molinists). This is because for all we know, 
actions that seem to be free might very well have hidden causes.2 
Second, Craig says that the Law of Excluded Middle is plausible for 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (338). But since this argument 
assumes that there is a fact of the matter concerning what an agent would 
freely do if placed in some circumstances C, I think that it comes too close 
to begging the question to be useful in this context. 
Third, Craig claims that the Bible is full of counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom (338). In response, I don't think that this is at all clear, since the 
Bible never explicitly says that we are free in a Libertarian sense (and the 
counterfactuals of freedom that interest the Molinist are all about 
Libertarian freedom). The scriptures never seem to address this issue 
directly, and some authors have argued persuasively that one could inter-
pret many passages in terms of a compatibilist account of freedom. 3 Craig 
suggests without much argument that if we do not possess Libertarian 
freedom, then God is the author of sin (339), but people have also argued 
that Molinism makes God the author of sin,4 and there seems to be no hope 
of resolving that disagreement in a non-question-begging way. 
Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that other Molinists have tried to 
provide warrant for the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of 
freedom. Alvin Plantinga, for example, suggests that if we know that 
Curley freely accepted a bribe of $35,000, then we have good reason to 
think that Curley would have freely accepted a bribe of $36,0005 • Of 
course, the counterfactual of creaturely freedom concerning Curley and the 
larger bribe seems plausible to us only given that we know that Curley 
accepted the smaller bribe. Hence the Grounding Objector will not find 
this example plausible, because the situation is not parallel to the situation 
that obtained logically prior to creation, when Curley did not exist and 
hence had not accepted any bribes. 
But even if Craig is right in thinking that there are now some true coun-
terfactuals of creaturely freedom, this does not necessarily answer the 
Grounding Objection. The crucial claim that the Grounding Objector 
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needs to hold on to is that there were no true counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom logically prior to creation. At the beginning and the end of his 
paper, Craig quotes Alvin Plantinga's reply to the Grounding Objection: 
"It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at 
least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be 
grounded in this way" (337, 348). Craig says that no anti-Molinist has yet 
responded to this simple retort to the Grounding Objection. Well, 1 am not 
an anti-Molinist (in fact, I'm inclined to be a Molinist myself, making this 
commentary an instance of "friendly fire"), but I am happy to respond to 
Plantinga on behalf of the Grounding Objector. His simple retort poses the 
problem incorrectly. First of all, the current truth of some counterfactuals 
of freedom is not sufficient for Molinism; instead, Molinists need to assume 
that a large number of counterfactuals of freedom were true logically prior 
to creation. Second, the Grounding Objector need not claim that all true 
propositions are grounded in a certain way. 
To make this point more clear, let's consider Craig's criticism of the idea 
that all true propositions must be caused to be true by concrete objects. 
Clearly Craig is right that this idea is mistaken. (He provides several coun-
terexamples in his paper on p.34l.) But the Grounding Objector need not 
claim that all truths are grounded in a certain way, just that certain truths 
must be. In particular, the Grounding Objector needs to insist on some-
thing like the following principle: 
GO: The truth of a true proposition concerning a specific human per-
son must be explained in terms of the actual situation of the person in 
question. 
None of Craig's examples is a counterexample to this principle. (There 
may be counterexamples out there, but my point is just that this is the 
direction in which the Grounding Objector is clearly pointing.) 
Craig's suggestion that the causal terminology often used to state the 
Grounding Objection is actually just a rhetorical flourish seems quite right 
to me (340). The real issue behind the Grounding Objection is not really 
causation per se, but explanation. The big question is this: logically prior to 
creation, what explains why a given true counterfactual of creaturely free-
dom is true, and what explains why a given false counterfactual of crea-
turely freedom is false? 
In response to this question, which seems to me to be the essence of the 
Grounding Objection, Craig offers nothing very promising for the Molinist 
to say. He does suggest that the truth-makers for counterfactuals of crea-
turely freedom might be the corresponding states of affairs disclosed by the 
disquotation principle (Craig, p.18), so that (for example) "If I were rich, 1 
would buy a Mercedes" is made true by the "counterfact" that if I were rich, 
1 would buy a Mercedes. (I like the term "counterfact", by the way.) But this 
is not really a satisfying explanation. Facts (or obtaining states of affairs, as 
Craig uses this term) are themselves abstract entities. As Plantinga points 
out, it is customary to regard contingent states of affairs (or facts) as obtain-
ing in virtue of some arrangement of concrete objects. ("Obtaining or actuali-
ty for states of affairs is like truth for propositions. The proposition [(3) G. 
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Cantor is a mathematician] is true; had thillgs been appropriately different, it 
would have been false"6.) So the truth of a contingent proposition concern-
ing a specific human person (or the obtaining of a state of affairs involving a 
specific human person) is customarily to be explained in terms of the actual 
situation of the specific human person in question. In sum, it is unsatisfying 
to explain the truth of the proposition in terms of the obtaining of the state of 
affairs, since the obtaining of such states of affairs seems itself to require 
grounding (and if it does not, then its obtaining will be just as mysterious to 
the Grounding Objector as the ungrounded truth of a counterfactual of free-
dom). Finally, since the Grounding Objector will no doubt deny the 
(ungrounded) obtaining of the relevant counterfacts (and reasonably so), this 
style of explanation is also dialectially ineffective. 
Craig's appeal to counterfacts confirms the suspicion that Molinists 
must simply accept the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logi-
cally prior to creation as a brute, unexplained fact. There seems to be no 
dialectically effective way to answer the Grounding Objection, so perhaps 
the Molinist should simply reply that there is no explanation at all for these 
truths. Craig suggests that the demand for an explanation here essentially 
denies the existence of Libertarian freedom, but I'm not sure about that. 
Libertarians need not be committed to the truth of counterfactuals of free-
dom logically prior to creation. (And in any case, the Grounding Objector 
need not accept Libertarian freedom.) 
If Molinists claim that there is no explanation for the truth of counterfac-
tuals of creaturely freedom prior to creation, is that bad for them? Not nec-
essarily. It depends on what you want from a theory of providence, really. 
The costs and benefits of Molinism must be considered carefully, from dif-
ferent points of view. In the end, it may be the case that Molinism is worth 
the price of admission, brute facts and essences and all. (That is my own 
suspicion, for the record.) Even Robert Adams, perhaps the most promi-
nent of the Grounding Objectors, concedes in one place that his arguments 
do not amount to refutations of Molinism and that he himself simply can-
not understand how counterfactuals of freedom could be true without 
some explanation of their truth7• So maybe Molinists are able to conceive 
of somethillg that Grounding Objectors are not. In any case, I still disagree 
with Craig's overall negative assessment of the Grounding Objection 
because I think that it raises a good question based on a plausible view 
concerning the explanation of contingent truths about specific human per-
sons. (Or at least that's the direction in which the Grounding Objector is 
pointing.) So although I myself think that Molinism is probably the best 
game in town, I also think that the Grounding Objection gives non-
Molinists a plausible reason to playa different game instead. 
Morehead State University 
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